Where Lisbon Was Won

Last year in the wake of the rejection of the first Lisbon Treaty, Simon put up a great post with the six key reasons it failed to pass. It is well worth running through these against the experience from yesterday because it looks like lessons were learned and learned well.

The first reason for the No:

6. Negativity and the French . Through out the campaign Much of the talk about the treaty was how we will become isolated , how we will be damaged and this negativity was totally encapsulated by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stupid quote of the campaign. The Irish will come “the first Victims” if this is rejected

Whatever about last time out this time our European neighbours kept their mouth shut, well the ones that mattered. Instead we got the UKIP party as Nigel Farage spent two weekends in Ireland (the first to publicise their leaflet, the second to observe results). Farage was not a man who would be immediately warmed to by the Irish electorate and so it proved that foreign intervention worked against the no side this time as opposed to the insane comments from Kouchner and that quote from Giscard d’Estaing. The quote still made an appearance wherever Declan Ganely was on the airwave but there was far less traction to it – it had trumped one but now was old-hat and rebuffed.

The next reason:

5. Fighting the Elite. The way the treaty was sold was terrible. One of the ways it was sold was by the great and the good acting condescendingly to the no side. There seemed to be an atmosphere of “we are your betters trust us”.

There sure was and if there was any hope of avoiding it this time around it lay in getting Dick Roche off the stage and sending Michael Martin in well briefed and focussed on the task at hand. Last time out it was the political class that lost with with a failure to engage, failure to explain and an attitude that stank. Little or no civil society action was present to inform people and everyone ignored the referendum commission material. There was no effort to inform one-self. This might reflect a disconnect between the right to vote and responsibility to inform oneself or the altogether more defensible position that no matter what you read it was impossible to escape the feeling of being taken for granted. There are some worrying things about Lisbon and the political class (especially government) didn’t consider allaying those concerns and instead chose to pat us on the head.

This time around, ably assisted by a yes group for every niche minority in the state, the pro-treaty camp got their act together. The chair of the referendum commission took a high profile stance attempting to arbitrate between spin and lies. He immediately deflated (at a media level) the Coir bubble and left them scrabbling through estates and church car parks for a sympathetic ear. The independent groups did the decent thing and explained Lisbon. The opposition – especially Fine Gael – got on their bus bike and canvassed.

The last time out this didn’t happen and Lisbon was taken for granted – we had local election candidates on the bloody posters! This time there was a professional campaign that almost addressed every worry.

4. EU Spokespeople: Lucinda and Dick Roche were not the ideal people to do early running setting out the Yes agenda while the others waited to see who would succeed Bertie Ahern. While they went much quieter towards the end of the campaign, my own experience was that they were as likely to turn people off their position or voting than support them.

This we mentioned above – the front bench from all parties took this one on board. Enda Kenny shook hands (his best characteristic as leader), Cowen left Michael Martin to fight the battle and Martin dismembered everyone he took on. He has probably had the best three weeks of his political life. He didn’t have to haul the party over the line but within a political campaign geared from all sides toward a yes he was the fulcrum around which much of it spun. And he nailed it.

3. Voting no was ‘pro-EU’: For the first time in the history of EU referenda in this country it was legitimately presented that a vote against the Lisbon treaty was a vote in favour of Europe. The people who consider themselves pro-EU were never able to rationalise a no vote in this way before since most of those opposed to EU would end up taking us out of Europe.

Otherwise known as the Ganley factor. You will be sick of being told by now that there is a hard core of voters who will always vote no to EU treaties. They are roughly 30% of the electorate. You must overcome this number (usually via a 55%+ turnout) to get your proposition through. The last time out that calculation was completely undone by the arrival of Declan Ganley of Libertas. He operated in the ground between left- and right- wing no campaigners (but most definitely on the right side of the spectrum) in a way that legitimised the no vote to middle-class voters. He was a businessman, a family man and a decent enough bloke by the looks of it. He was “pro-EU” and “pro-democracy” and who isn’t?

Ganley made it easier for people to vote no in a section of society that almost always votes yes. This was sufficient to swing the vote totally away from the yes side. This time around he returned following a terrible EU election (wheelie-bin central) after resigning from political life. He came back with two weeks to go, no strategy and a few soundbites. We had heard it before, he had gotten a complete kicking in the meantime and he didn’t return with that one killer point (like saving the commissioner) which he had last time. Instead he had to debate and we learned in May/June that he is deeply uncomfortable in debate where he cannot rely on the talking points.

So there was no legitimating voice for a no vote as being pro-EU other than the usual suspects of McKenna, Higgins et. al. It didn’t swing in the face of groups like Ireland for Europe and even Michael O Leary.

2. Class Voting: Ireland has seen an extensive sociological change over the past ten years but it is inescapable that the referendum results point to a stark difference between the more well off in this country and middle class, working class, labourers, farmers etc. Rural Ireland, fishing villages, poorer constituencies all went against Lisbon. Wealthier areas supported Lisbon but – tellingly – there were not enough of them to carry the day. Class may not have dominated our politics but the divide today suggests that a break exists between the establishment, their supporters and the rest of the country. To what extent this informs future politics is difficult to tell but I suspect that upon having delivered a swift kick to the arse, the electorate will revert to type.

This time around the picture is less clear. Last time out the West said no en-masse. This time around no coastal county from Sligo to Cork-South West voted yes by less than a 60:40 margin. That suggests that the concerns of farmers and rural dwellers were either muted or overcome by higher urban turnouts. Indeed in Donegal – the only county with a no vote – where there is little urban areas to speak of bar Letterkenny the race was a 49:51 (Donegal North-East) and 49.7:50.3 (Donegal South-West). This suggests that there was still deep worry in rural areas and the peripheries about the direction of Europe. The control of fishing policy and support of farming.

The closest Yes races were all in areas of Dublin that are marked by high numbers of working- and middle- class voters: Dublin South Central 58:42, Dublin North West 55:45, Dublin Central 62: 38, Dublin North East 63:37. These are not razor tight margins – but with turnout up in Dublin one might need far more tally information to surmise the relationship between our working and middle class areas and the EU. It seems likely that there was a drop-off in those who voted no last time and the yes side were joined by plenty of swing voters from last time and more who didn’t vote in Lisbon 1.

1. The Treaty. The Treaty had three flaws that made it lose. One was the loss of a commissioner the other was its length. The EU is seen as a distant entity away from the control of the people. The idea that Ireland would lose what little control they had scared people. The idea that we could have no say in important matters is not something people wanted to consider and rejected it. The control of Taxes were not set in stone. No one knew what the future of low tax Ireland would be. The other fault with the treaty is its length. It was too long, too confusing and too hard to read. The fact that McCreavy and Cowen said they didn’t read it certainly did not help. People were not clear about what they were signing up to. And the debates seem more intent on warning us of impending doom then selling the treaty. Kevin Myres said.

The final argument from the ‘Yes’ camp is that the ‘No’ side really doesn’t understand Lisbon. And, for once, they’re right. So why should I say ‘Yes’ to a legal document I don’t understand? My lawyer would never urge me to buy a house under such conditions.

Why would we follow different rules when voting for the future of our country?

And in the end people said I wouldn’t follow different rules and voted No.

So Brian took this defeat on the chin and went to Brussels. He played his ‘high-risk game’ with that open letter to leaders. He got guarantees on a commissioner until 2014. Guarantees on the state of our tax system and abortion laws and he came back to us. The treaty hadn’t changed. Nor had many of the arguments. Last time out a mixture of arrogance and bad debating killed the treaty. This time around the points were sharp, the concerns were met (bar defence and neturality which was a muted element to this campaign) and the yes side steam rollered through.

The fact remains this treaty is a large gnomic mess, people don’t know what it will mean for all aspects of EU or National politics but nonetheless they were willing to take the assurances at face value. People knew to say they had read it – irrespective of the truth. They also had the fear factor. Lisbon promised recovery we were told, “yes for jobs”, said IBEC “yes for jobs,” said Fianna Fail. Intel and Ryanair both said being in Europe was better for the jobs market than being out of it. With so many unemployed were we going to take the risk they were lying? Not a chance. From Monday the ball is in Mr. Lenihan’s court.